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THE INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE:
PROS AND CONS OF MINERAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY
I.

Introduction
A.

Summary.
Any major mineral development project, wherever

located, is a long-term, complex, difficult and risky business
proposition.

Moving such a project forward always requires

solutions to numerous legal and technical problems involved in
acquiring the rights to prospect for the minerals, in structuring
the transaction and acquiring extraction rights from the mineral
resources owner, in financing the project, obtaining
environmental permits, solving marketing and transportation
problems and entering into sales contracts, and in producing the
minerals for market.
In the author's professional experience, developed from
the perspective of representing a lessee of coal from the Crow
Tribe of Indians since the early 1970's, an additional level of
complexity is added to almost every step of the process when the
minerals to be developed are owned in trust for an Indian Tribe.
This additional complexity can cause delays, uncertainty and
competitive disadvantages to the project.
This outline sets out a very selective and brief
chronology of significant events occurring during the development
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and operation of the Westmoreland Resources, Inc.

("WRI")

Absaloka Coal mine on the ceded strip adjoining the Crow
Reservation.

It next identifies some of the significant legal

and practical issues for WR I 's relationship with the Crow Tribe
arising from those events.

It then suggests that, from the

Industry perspective, many of the legal issues relating to the
development of Indian mineral resources which will have been
discussed by the preceding speakers can make development of
1

i

Indian-owned minerals seems to be significantly more uncertain
and risky than developing competing state, federal or fee
reserves.

B.

General Background.
During the early 1970's, the members of the Western

coal mining industry were affected by numerous major legal and
public policy disputes.

These

involved environmental impact

statement disclosures on coal leasing and development, land
management and planning issues and implementation of various
aspects of the Clean Air Act, the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act and the Clean Water Act.

(See, e.q.. Kleppe v.

Sierra Club; 427 U.S. 390, 49 L.Ed. 2d 576, 96 S.Ct. 2718 (1976);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hughes. 454 F. Sujpp. 148
(D.D.C. 1978).)
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The WRI Absaloka mine also had many of these same types
of general environmental issues to litigate.
Morton, 527 F .2d 786 (9th Cir., 1975).

(See, e.g.. Cady v.

In addition, WRI had to

deal with many other legal and practical issues arising out of
the Indian-owned status of the coal it had leased.

II•

Chronology of an Indian Lands Mineral Development

A.

Chronology of Significant Events.
As indicated in the "events" chronology below, WRI

became involved in significant litigation and Interior Department
proceedings involving various aspects of the Interior
Department's trust responsibility, the Crow Ceded Strip's legal
status, the taxing powers of Montana and of the Crow Tribe, the
regulation of surface mining and other legal and economic issues.
1.

On October 20, 1970, in a competitive sale
conducted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),
WRI was the successful bidder for two Mineral
Prospecting Permits (Tracts 2 and 3) in Big Horn
Country, Montana on the so-called "Ceded STrip"
immediately to the North of the Crow Reservation.
The permits gave WRI the right to prospect for and
obtain leases on specific terms and conditions
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from the Crow Tribe of Indians for the coal
underlying Tract 2 and Tract 3.

2.

On June 6, 1972, WRI converted the two Prospecting
Permits it obtained in 1970 into coal leases.
leases were approved by the BIA.

The

The leases provided

for a $0,175 per ton royalty to the Tribe, an annual
lease rental of $1.00 per acre and an annual minimum
royalty of $2.00 per acre for the first four years and
thereafter a minimum annual royalty of $5.00 per acre.
The term of the leases was for 10 years and so long
thereafter as coal is produced in paying quantities.
The leases also had a unitization provision that
allowed the production in paying quantities from one
Tract to satisfy the paying quantities provision of the
other Tract.

3.

On June 15, 1972, WRI signed identical contracts with
four utilities providing for the sale of an aggregate
4.0 million tons of coal per year for 20 years
beginning in 1974.

The tonnage for 1974 was to be

prorated based on the start-up date of the mine.

The

contracts passed royalty and tax costs through to the
customers.
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4.

After acquiring the Crow Tribe leases and signing the
long term contracts with the four utilities, WRI began
developing the Tract 3 lease by proceeding to construct
a 38 mile rail spur, erecting a 75 cubic yard dragline,
applying for mine permits, and constructing the plant
facilities necessary to ship the contract tonnage.
W R I 's investment in plant and equipment quickly
approached $70 million.

During this process, WRI

became involved in national scale (Kleppe. supra) and
"site specific" (Cady, supra) litigation regarding the
Interior Department's compliance with NEPA on western
coal development and coal mine permitting.

5.

At about the same time as the mine was being built, the
Arab oil embargo and the "energy crisis" led to a
rapid increase in oil prices and to a rush to obtain
and develop Western coal.

This, in turn, led to a

demand from the Tribe that the 1972 coal leases be
renegotiated.

WRI reached several agreements on

renegotiated lease terms with the Crow Tribe's mineral
committee, but none were approved by the Tribal
Council.

During this apparent impasse, on July 1,
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1974, WRI shipped the first unit train of coal from
Tract 3 to Northern States Power.

6.

On July 13, 1974, the Crow Tribe, acting through the
Crow Tribal Council, adopted a resolution declaring the
Coal Mining Leases for Tracts 2 and 3 invalid and
directing that action be taken with the Secretary of
the Interior or otherwise to establish such invalidity.
On July 31, 1974, the Crow Tribe filed a Petition with
the Secretary of the Interior asking that the leases be
declared invalid or modified.

The grounds asserted

were that the leases did not conform in all respects to
the BIA coal leasing regulations, and that the BIA had
inadequately protected the Tribe's interests, in breach
of its trust responsibilities and its fiduciary duties.

7.

WRI opposed the Tribe's petition before the Secretary,
and no action to cancel the leases was taken pending
efforts to settle.

Following extensive negotiations in

Washington, D.C., representatives of the Crow Tribe and
Westmoreland reached an agreement settling and
compromising all their disputes and differences, which
was then approved by the Tribal Council.

The

settlement was represented by two Amended Coal Mining
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Leases, a Land Purchase Agreement and a Settlement
Agreement, all approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.

The Amended Coal Mining leases provided for

a sliding scale percentage royalty rising to six
percent in place of the $0,175 per ton royalty in the
original leases.

At the time the leases were signed,

this was the highest percentage royalty in effect in
the West.

It was subject to renegotiation after 10

years on a portion of the coal under lease.

8.

In April, 1975, the Montana Legislature passed a bill
increasing the Montana Coal Severance tax from $0.34
per ton to 30% of the Contract Value.

It also created

a new Gross Proceeds tax, applied to 45% of the gross
proceeds of coal mining at the county mill levy.

For

the Severance tax, Contract Value was defined as the
F.O.B. mine price less taxes based on production or
value.

Taxes based on production or value can also be

deducted before determining the Gross Proceeds from
mining.

The midwestern utilities who had contracted to

buy Montana coal, including WR I 's customers, brought a
suit in Montana State Court to challenge the
constitutionality of these taxes.
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They were ultimately

unsuccessful in avoiding and in limiting these Montana
taxes, both in the Supreme Court and in Congress.

9.

The Crow Tribe passed its own severance tax in 1976.
The tax rate was 25% of the F.O.B. mine price, with no
deductions.

This tax was approved for the Crow

Reservation proper (where no coal mining was being
conducted) in 1977, but was not approved by the
Secretary for the Ceded Strip because of a disclaimer
of jurisdiction in the Crow Tribe's constitution.

10.

In 1976, the minimum royalty for new leases of surface
mined federal coal was set by Congress at 12.5 percent
of the F.O.B. mine price.

11.

Congress passed the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act in 1977.

Section 710 of the Act,

30 U.S.C. §1300, provided for a study of the
question of coal mine regulation on "Indian /
Lands", defined by the Act to include all lands
owned in trust for a Tribe.

Section 1300 (h)

directed the Secretary to analyze the
jurisdictional status of such lands outside of
Indian Reservations.

Also under the Act, a
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Federal Reclamation Fee of $0.35 per ton became
effective on October 1, 1977.

This fee goes to

reclaim abandoned mines, coal and otherwise, and
for the administration of the Act, but does not go
to reclaim land currently being mined.

The mine

operator pays for current and future reclamation
costs.

12.

A Federal Black Lung tax became effective on April 1,
1978.

The tax was 2% of the F.O.B. mine price or $0.25

whichever was less.

This tax is to cover past claims

for Black Lung benefits.

WRI and its mining contractor

pay for future claims through private insurance.

13.

In 1978, the Crow Tribe brought suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Montana against the
State of Montana, and Big Horn and Treasure Counties,
seeking to invalidate the Montana Severance and Gross
Proceeds taxes as unconstitutional.

WRI interevened as

a defendant, seeking judgments that neither the Tribe
nor Montana could tax its mining operation.

After ten

years, this litigation is entering its third phase.
The Tribe has prevailed against the State, but WRI1s
utility customers are now seeking to intervene to
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challenge the Tribe's right to obtain tax monies which
they have paid WRI in the past, including the
approximately $28 which WRI has paid into Court.

Crow

Tribe of Indians v. State of Montana (Crow I), 650
F .2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, den. 459 U.S. 916
(1982),

(reversing 469 F. Supp. 154)

(D. Mont. 1979).

Crow Tribe of Indians v. State of Montana (Crow II),
657 F. Supp. 573 (D. Mont. 1985), reversed, 819 F.2d
895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd ___ U.S. ____ (1988).
Because this case is very much in active litigation at
the time this outline is being prepared, I will not
further characterize the positions of the parties.

B.

An Overlay Chronology of Issues.
The "Events Chronlogy" set out above carries with it a

"practical and legal issues" chronology which has developed
during the same 18-year period.

The issues which are significant

for purposes of the present discussion are as follows:
1.

Who speaks for (and can bind) the Crow Tribe in
business negotiations?

2.

Is an agreement with the Crow Tribe, which the
Secretary has approved, going to be enforceable in
accordance with its terms?
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How?

3.

What is the geographical extent of the governmental
powers of the Crow Tribe?

4.

What is the precise legal status of the Ceded Strip?

5.

To what extent can Montana regulate the Mining of Crow
Tribe coal under SMCRA?

6.

To what extent can the Crow Tribe regulate the mining
of Crow Tribe coal under SMCRA?

7.

How much duplication in surface mining regulation can
the WRI mine withstand?

8.

How much duplication in taxation can the WRI mine
withstand?

9.

What approach will the Crow Tribe take in exercising
its newly-recognized taxing powers in competition with
other governments.

10.

To what extent can W R I 's customers, who have taken as
little Crow Tribe coal as their contracts permit, be
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persuaded to increase their purchase commitments based
on Tribal decisions?

Ill.

Indian Mineral Resource Development Issues from
an Industry Lawyer's Perspective

A.

The General Point of View of Industry.
In relating "pros and cons" of dealing with Tribes on

natural resource matters, I can only speak for myself, and
indicate the concerns which I have heard my clients and others in
industry express.

In a very general way, the events and the

issues set out above have instituted the following present
viewpoints.

1.

As a lawyer for a number of natural resources
developers, I tend to have a perspective on the legal
issues being discussed at this conference which is
different from lawyers responsible for representing
Tribal governments.

It is not a negative perspective,

but it recognizes previous difficulties my clients have
encountered, and insists that new arrangements avoid
them.

2.

I recognize and respect the desires of Indian Tribes
to play more direct and significant roles in the
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development of their natural resources.

However, these

desires raise legal issues which do not have to be
dealt with when developing federal or state-owned
minerals, and which many clients may wish to avoid
because their tolerance for uncertainty is low.

B.
1.

Regulatory Issues.
My clients do not generally see any particular
advantage to them in dealing with yet another sovereign
on what are already complex regulatory issues.

2.

They think the only guaranteed outcome of a dispute
over who has power to regulate them is uncertainty and
duplication, neither of which are good for their
business.

3.

If they believe that economic self-interest will lead
their Tribal regulators to permit mining techniques or
other environmental protection measures any less
stringent than the structure of the federal or state
requirements, I believe they will be in for a rude
awakening.
a.

The coal mining laws don't appear to contemplate
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any such relaxation of performance standards in
Indian Lands Regulatory Programs,
b.

Any easier regulatory regime for Indian-regulated
mining operations would be difficult to justify
environmentally or politically, either within the
Tribe or outside of it.

4.

Stricter environmental regulation is likely to generate
competitive difficulties.

C.

1.

Economic Issues.

Clients are likely to fear that the Interior Department
will see to it that the economic terms one agrees to
with an Indian Tribe will be upset if the market turns
against the Tribe, but will be immutable if the market
turns against them.
a.

Crow Tribe royalty rates were readjusted upward
under Interior Department pressure when coal was
in short supply.

b.

10 years later in a soft market, the Department
refused to approve new royalties on a portion of
the Tribe's coal at less than the federal rates.
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2.

Clients are likely to fear that they will generally be
expected to defer to a Tribe's economic needs:
a.

In usual business negotiations, neither of the
parties generally is expected to act against its
own self-interest in order to provide benefits to
the other.

b.

There is a tendency for this convention not to be
accepted by Indian Tribes and those who represent
them.

c.

Whatever terms are agreed to, they will not be
seen as sufficiently protective of Tribal
interests by future evaluators.

3.

Tribes tend to want to be involved in setting the
economic terms of specific transactions.

4.

Clients tend to want fixed royalty and tax rates, and
freedom to market on their own with no need to consult
with a Tribe on terms and conditions.

IV.

Conclusion
A minerals industry member is likely to look at

natural resources development opportunities in some overall
context, i .e .. realizing that in today's markets it can choose
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among competing resource owners with whom to deal.

Indian Tribes

and those advising them must consider carefully how to approach
industry member reluctance to deal with unusual, uncertain and
complex arrangements, and prepare to deal constructively with the
business and legal issues industry members, and their customers,
will be concerned with.
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